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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FLYING DIAMOND OIL
CORPORATION, formerly known
as FLYING DIAMOND CORPORATION,
A Utah corporation,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a
limited partnership; RALPH
M. NEWTON, EUGENE M. NEWTON
and SCOTT F. NEWTON, general
partners; and EUGENE B. NEWTON,
individually, and EDNA ELLIOTT
NEWTON, his wife,

Case No. 19178

DefendantsRespondents.
and
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION
CO., a Texas corporation,
Intervenor
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This Clise involves the conflicting claims of the parties to moneys paid on the
()l'OL1uct1on of 011 and gas from certain lands in Summit County, Utah.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The case was tried to the district court with out a jury and judgment was
entered dividing the moneys paid on production: one-fourth to the plaintiff Flying
Diamond Oil Corporation, one-fourth to the Newton defendants and one-half to the
defendant Bass Enterprises Production Co.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Bass seeks affirmance of the judgment of the district court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The lands involved in this lawsuit were part of a grant to the Union Pacific
Railroad.

In 1971 the Newtons owned the railroad lands and the railroad's

subsidiary, Champlin Petroleum Corporation, owned the oil and gas in those lands.
The Newtons and Champlin entered into an agreement, hereinafter the "Surface
Owners Agreement", by which Champlin was given an easement to enter upon the
surface of the railroad lands, to drill for oil and gas and to construct and maintain
facilities for the production of oil and gas from the lands.
Surface Owner's Agreement.

(Section 1 of the

A copy of the agreement is attached to the pretrial

order (R. 276, 285) and is an exhibit to the Flying Diamond brief.)
Champlin agreed to pay to the Newtons, with certain exceptions that are not
material, the value of 2 1/2% "of all the oil and gas and associated liquid
hydrocarbons hereinafter produced, saved and marketed" from the railroad lands,
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lierc1m1fter the "2 1/2% payment", "so long as Champlin is receiving" production or
royalties from the lands. (Section 2 of the Surface Owner's Agreement; R. 289.)
Sections 3 and 5 of the Surface Owner's Agreement provide for payments to
be made by an operator under a unitization agreement for the construction and
ma111tenance of certain facilities and payments for damage to land, buildings and
growing crops.

Moneys received under Sections 3 and 5 of the agreement are not

involved in this lawsuit.
Section 7 of the Surface Owner's Agreement contains the following provision
with respect to the payments to be made by Champlin (R. 290-291):
Subject to the provisions of Section 9 hereof, it is agreed
that the covenants to pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3 and
5 hereof shall be covenants running with the surface ownership of
the described premises and shall not be held or transferred
separately therefrom, and any sums payable under this agreement
shall be paid to the person or persons owning the surface of the
described premises as of the date the oil or gas or associated
liquid hydrocarbon production is marketed. Champlin shall not,
however, become obligated to make such payments to any
subsequent purchaser of the described premises and shall continue
to make such payments to the Land Owner until the first day of
the month following the receipt by Champlin of notice of change
of ownership, consisting of the original or certified copies of the
instrument or instruments constituting a complete chain of title
from the Land Owner to the party claiming such ownership, and
then only as to payments thereafter made.
Section 9 of the Surftice Owner's Agreement provides for the continuation of
the agreement in force and effect so long as there is production of oil and gas
from the railroad lands. (R. 291.)
The Champlin agreement was recorded on October 1, 1971. (R. 285.)
The following year, the Newtons executed a warranty deed, dated February 1,
1972, purporting to convey and assign to Bass, in paragraph I. B. of the deed:
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One-half of the royalty (of any type) from production
of minerals that the Grantor actually reC'e1ves or is entitled
to receive until February 1, 2072, from the following described land:
SEE EXHil:llT "8" ATTACHED, * * *
(A copy of the Newton deed is attached to the pretrial order (R. 293-294) and is
an exhibit to the Flying Diamond brief.)
The land described in Exhibit B to the Newton deed includes all of the
railroad lands involved in this lawsuit and in the Champlin agreement.

The deed

also deals with other lands in which the Newtons owned the minerals (Paragraph I.
A and Exhibit A to the deed) which lands and minerals are not involved in this
lawsuit.
The Newtons' deed to Bass was recorded on March 20, 1972. (R. 293.)
Later, in 1974, the Newtons were approached by Flying Diamond who wanted
to buy the ranch and their mineral rights.

As to the mineral rights, the then

principals of Flying Diamond were told by the Newtons that they had sold to Bass
"50 per cent of the two and a half per cent that the railroad paid on their
sections." (Tr. 64.)*

Scott Newton testified that "we come to the agreement that

they would take a quarter of what was left of the half, and we would keep a
quarter." (Tr. 65.)
Ralph Newton testified of the negotiations with the principals of Flying
Diamond as follows (Tr. 80, 81):
• • • that when we first started negotiating with Flying
Diamond we were going to keep all the mineral interests,
• References to "Tr." are to the reporter's trnnscript of the trial, the first
page of which is numbered as H. 526.
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railroad included, but they said they wouldn't buy the property without 50 per cent of our interests in both categories
there and so if we had to let it all go we wouldn't have sold
ttnd they said if they didn't get a fourth of it, why, they
wouldn't buy, so we came to, we thought, a happy medium
there.

•

•

•

•

•

Well, we just pointed out that the two and a half per
cent would be cut three ways, Bass Enterprises had 50 per
cent of it and we had 50 per cent, Flying Diamond would
get a fourth of it and we would get a fourth and they were
satisfied with that.
On or about April 24, 1974, Flying Diamond agreed to buy from the Newtons
their lands including the railroad land involved in this lawsuit and also "one-half of
their oil, gas and other mineral rights and estates." (Paragraph 6 at page 4 of the
contract, hereinafter the "Ranch Purchase Contract," a copy of which is attached
to the pretrial order; R. 298.)
The "mineral rights and estates" purchased by Flying Diamond are also
ref erred to, in paragraph 6 of the Ranch Purchase contract as a "mineral interest"
which includes, in subparagraph 6 (a) (2), in the same language used in paragraph I.
B of the Newton deed (supra p. 4):
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from the production of minernls that the Seller actually receives, or is
entitled to receive from the Property so designated in
Attachment A-1 until January 1, 2073. * • *
The property referred to in subparagraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase
Contract is four of the six sections of railroad land involved in the Surface
Owner's Agreement and in the Newtons' deed to Bass. Flying Diamond obtained an
option to purchase the other two sections of railroad land.
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The Newtons' interest

in the 2 1/2% payment was the only mineral interest of tlllY type tht1t tile Newtons
had in the railroad lands. (Tr. 75-76.l
After the Ranch Purchase Contract was executed, oil wus discovered on the
railroad lands.

Since the beginning of production, Champlin has remitted to Flying

Diamond and the latter has retained all of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment.
(R. 279.)
When the Newtons claimed a share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment,
Flying Diamond filed this lawsuit to obtain, among other things, a determination
under Count I of its complaint that Flying Diamond could keep all of the proceeds
of the payment.
moneys received.

(R. 1.)

Bass intervened to assert its claim to one-half of the

(R. 147 .)

In response to a request for admissions, the Newtons

admitted that the effect of their deed

Wl\S

to assign to Bass one-half of the 2

1/2% payment. (R. 270-272.)
Champlin, although it knew of the lawsuit, did not intervene.
At the trial on the issue in Count 1, Flying Diamond sttlted its general
objection "to any testimony being received with respect to the surface owners
agreement on the grounds it violates the parole evidence rule." (Tr. 59; and see
Tr. 33.)

No objection was made to the receipt of evidence regarding the Newton's

deed or the Ranch Purchase Contract.
Despite its general ob;ect1on, Flying Ui11mond introdu<'ed (Tr. 90) t11c deposition testimony of Robert Lagerstrom, Champlln's itlnd l!ltlllf!ger.

In >tdd1t1011 to Mr.

Lagerstrom's testimony about the purpose of the tlgrcement, quoted tit pHges 9 and
10 of Flying Diamond's brief, his testimony on
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t11c

tollow1ng µomts

WHS

received

w1tl1out objection (Tr. 94): (1) that it would not matter to Champlin if a landowner
entered into an agreement with somebody else to share the 2 1/2% payment with
tliern after it was received from Champlin (deposition p.

30); (2) that in his

oprn1on a judgment creditor of the landowner could reach the landowner's interest
rn the 2 1/2% payment (deposition p. 39); (3) that the business purpose for Section
7 rn the Surface Owner's Agreement was to avoid difficulties in making payments
to surfa<'e owners in situations where there are "many, many town lots (deposition
p. 53); and (4) if the current landowner were to agree to share the 2 1/2%
payment with someone else after receiving it from Champlin, Champlin would have
no objection (deposition pp. 55-56).
Counsel for the Newtons and for Bass offered certain pages of the deposition-testimony of William B. Collister and Flying Diamond's counsel asked the
court to read additional pages from the deposition. (R. 88-89.)

Mr. Collister

test1f1ed in his deposition that he drafted the Newtons' deed to Bass to cover

the

2 1/2'" payment, which he referred to as a "royalty", and, in addition, to cover
other mineral rights that might be involved in possible future litigation in Utah
based upon the decis1011 rn Radke v.
Wolu. 1959).

Union Pacific Railroad Co., 334 P. 2d 1077

(Collister deposition pp.

21-22.)

Mr. Collister said that by the

wonls "t>nt1tled to receive," used in paragraph I. B of the deed, he had intended to
rmt1c1µHte " situ11t1on where the railroad might not recognize rights to which the
'""fHc<> owner w<Juld be Pnt1tled (Collister derosition p. 51.)

Tl\., only w1t11es."" lit the trial were Scott and Ralph Newton who testified,
2''1''.~'·

pp. 4-1, that the Flyrng Diamond principals had agreed to a one-fourth share

ol thP ! \, 2'l:, payrnenl.
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No one testified for Flying Diamond.

No evidence was offered that Flying

Diamond intended to acquire a greater interest in the "mineral rights and estates"
on the railroad lands than the one-fourth interest provided for in paragraph 6 of
the Ranch Purchase Contract.
The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 526)
including findings of fact Nos. 6 and 9 that it was the intent of the Newtons and
Bass that Bass acquire one-half of the 2 1/2% payment and t11at it was the intent
of the Newtons and Flying Diamond that flying Diamond aequire one-fourth of the

2 1/2% payment (R. 428).

A final judgment was entered that Flying Diamond is

entitled to one-fourth, the Newtons to one-fourth and Bass to one-half of the 2

1/2% payment. (R. 460.)

ARGUMENT

BASS IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE 2 1/2%
PAYMENT
This lawsuit is an effort by Flying Diamond to keep all of the proceeds of
the 2 1/2% payment after it agreed with the Newtons, with knowledge of the prior
assignment to Bass, to take a one-fourth interest.
this effort must fail.
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There are several reasons why

!\.

!\

shttre in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is inherently assign-

~:--<'hamplin

promised to pay the Newtons the value of 2 1/2% of all the oil

H.nd g11s "produced, saved H.nd marketed," from the railroad lands. (Section 2 of the
Surface Owner's Agreement.) The Newtons, in effect, were granted a share in the
benefit that Champlin would receive from the production of its minerals.
share, the

That

1/2% payment, while not an estate in the minerals, is a share of

production of minerals and, therefore, by definition, a royalty.
Meyers, Oil And Gas Terms, p. 213 (1957).

Williams and

See also the discussions in Picard v.

Richards, 366 P. 2d 119, 122-123 (Wyo. 1961), and in Jones, Exercise of Executive
Rights In Connection With Non-Participating Royalty And Non-Executive Mineral
Interests, 15 S. W. Inst. Oil and Gas L. & Tax., pp. 35, 38, 52, 54, (1964), from
which it appears that the Newtons' share was analogous to, if it was not, a
"nonpartic1p>1ting" royalty interest.
assignable.

As with other property interests, a royalty is

Callahan v. Martin, 43 P. 2d 788 (Cal. 1935); Oil And Gas Terms, p.

213, supra.
"The grant of a royalty interest leaves in the grantor [Champlin] a mineral
estate burdened by an incorporeal hereditament in the nature of common-law
rent."

2 Willi>1ms and Meyers, Oil And Gas Law, §S 324.4, 338 pp. 56, 195 (1981).

Unaeerued rents are assignable and may be assigned to someone other than the
trnnsferee of the reversion.

Such an assignment would prevent the transfer of the

unH<'erued rent to a purchaser of the reversion who has knowledge of the assignment. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord And Tenant, SS 515, 528.
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The 2 1/2% payment is to be made

in

money.

The right to money due or to

become due in the future is assignable, Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson
Trucking Co., 23 U. 2d ll5, 458 P. 2d 873, 875 (1969), even when the contract
itself is not, Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182 P. 2d 182, 185 (Cal. 1947).
B.

The right to the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is separable from the

ownership of the railroad lands:-Flying Diamond's argument (Br. 17-24) that the
right to the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment is inseparable from the surface
ownership of the railroad lands was rejected in an analogous situation in Western
Union Telegraph Co.

v.

Shepard, 62 N.E. 154 (N.Y. 1901).

In that case, Western

Union owned and later sold certain property which, through mesne conveyances,
came to be owned by the defendant Shepard.

The original grant by Western Union

to Shephard's predecessor in title had contained the following reservation of claims
for damage to the property:

* * * [Western Union] reserves all claim or right of action
against the Metropolitan and Manhattan Elevated Railroad
Companies, or either of them, for any and all tnJury or
damage done to the aforesaid property, or to the vlilue or
uses thereof, in the past, present, or future, by reason of
the construction and operat10n of the elevated railroad in
front of the said premises, and as they are now constructed
and operated.
The defendant Shephard was aware of the reservation, but nevertheless sued the
railroad and obtained a judgment for damages to the property. (See 62 N.E. at p.
151.)

In an action by Western Union to recover the d1unages received by Shephard,

he argued that he should keep the damages because they were 111separable from
the fee which he owned and were, in effect, a payment for
land.

1111

The Supreme Court of New York rejected the Hrgument

at p. 156):
-10-

etiSement over his

11s

follows (62 N.E.

The inseparability of land from its easements is therefore immaterial.
We are not now dealing with the nonassignab11i ty of the easement apart from the land, but with
U1e money about to be handed over-proceeds of the damages done to the land by a trespass upon its easements. The
distinction is clear between the equitable right to the proceeds of the injury and the legal title to the thing or right
injured. Thus it was competent for the grantor and grantee
to agree that a part of the consideration of the land conveyed should consist of the money damages thereafter to be
recovered from the trespassers.
To paraphrase the Western Union Telegraph opinion, we are not now dealing
with the nonassignability of Champlin's easement apart from the railroad lands.
We are here dealing with money that Champlin has handed over for its use of the
land.

Flying Diamond has ignored the distinction between the equitable right to

the proceeds of the use of the land and the legal title to the land itself.

Thus it

was competent for Flying Diamond, as part of its consideration for the railroad
lands, to agree to take less than all of Champlin's payment for the use of those
lands.
C.
share

111

The Surface Owner's Agreement does not preclude an assignment of a
the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment:-Much is said by Flying Diamond

t1bout covenants running with the land in an effort to argue Champlin's alleged
concPrns 111 the Surface Owner's Agreement. (Br. 17-18)

A covenant is a promise

t1nd the only covenant or promise in the agreement so far as the 2 1/2% payment
1s

concerned 1s the promise of Champlin to make the payment to whoever happens

to be the surface owner, According to Champlin's records, when the oil and gas is
lllHrketecJ,

HS

spelled out 1n Section 7 of the agreement.

The judgment of the

district court lht1l ef!ch of the parties may share in the proceeds of the payment
does not ul ter Chumplin's "burden" of payment in any way.
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By Section 1 of the Surface Owner's Agreement Ct11impl111 obta111ed the r1glil
to go upon the railroad lands and nothing in the judg1nent d1m111ishes that rigt1t or
"benefit" in any way.
The burden and the benefit of Champlin in relallon to the surface owner,
whoever that may be at any given time, are simply not altered by any sharing

in

the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment.
Turning to Flying Diamond's argument regarding Restatement (Second) Of
Contracts, S 317 (2) (a), (Br. 23-24), there is no evidence to support its argument
that

"a

diversion

of

remittances"-actually

a

sharing

in

the

proceeds-would

materially impair Champlin's chance of obtaining return performance [right to go
on the land] or reduce the value of the Surface Owner's Agreement to Champlin.
There

being no

words

in

the

Surface Owner's

Agreement

precluding an

assignment of a share in the proceeds, Flying Diamond's ill"gument (Br. 23) based
upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S 317 (2) (c), is not in po111t.

An

unexpressed intention on Champlin's part to preclude any assignment of a sh!ire rn
the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment would not be recogmzed.
Contracts, S 873, p.

4 Corbrn

on

494 (1951); 3 Williston, Law of Contracts, § 422, (1981);

Allhusen v. Caristo, 303 N. Y 446, 103 N .E. 2d 891 (1952).
Even if the Surface Owner's Agreement had been written to preclude !iss1gnment of a share in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment, such a µrov1s10n, after
Champlin has made the payment, would not affect the rights and obligations of the
Newtons, Bass and Flying Diamond.

Restatement (SeconcJ) Of ('ontrncts, § 322 (2)

(b) (1981); 3 Williston, Law of ContraC'ts, S 422 at pp. 140-41 (I %0); St1irk v.
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NHt101111I

i{es"urch

~r_1ducc1, 130

&:

Design Corp.,

llO

A.

2d 143 (N.J. 1954); Johnston v.

P. 2d 405 (Cal. 1942).

In StHrk, supra, the plaintiff was the lessee of an office under a lease which
contained a coven1rnt against an assignment of the lease.

The plaintiff assigned

her interest in the lease to the defendant who subsequently refused to pay rent to
the plaintiff. The defendant argued that since an assignment to him was precluded
by the lease, the plaintiff could not recover rent from him.

The court noted that

the benefit of the covenant ran only to the lessor and that the defendant, as an
assignee of the lessee, gained no benefit from the covenant.
In the context of government contracts, wherein contractors are specifically
precluded by statute from assigning moneys to become due under a contract, it has
been consistently held that the restriction on assignment is solely for the benefit
of the government and does not affect the legal rights of the assignor and the
assignee as between themselves.

If a prohibition against assignment had been

placed in the Surface Owner's Agreement, that prohibition would have to "be
rnterpreted

111

the light of its purpose to give protection to" Champlin.

"After

payments have been collected and are in the hands of the" surface owner "with
notice,

"''i~11111enb

may be heeded, at all events, in equity if they will not

tru,trnte the ends to whict1 the prohibition was directed."
~uret;[,

300 U.S.

Martin v.

National

588, 596 (1937); Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v.

W"ll_"". c42 U.S. 7 (1916).
Tl1~

point of IHw involved here is summarized in, 3 Williston, Law of Con-

~':_t_'>, § L'.2

Ht p. 140, (1960) as follows:

-J:I-

A prohibition of nssignrne11t or H c•o1Hl1t1u11 re:-.tr1ct1ng
performance of the debtor's obl1gHt1on to the orig11111l µromisee is intended for the be11efit of the debtor Hild cmrnot
affect the legal or equ1tHble rights of the nss1gr10r and
assignee as between themselves.
There being no expressed prohibitio11 of Hss1g11rne11t

in

t11e Surface Owner's

Agreement, Flying Diamond's allegations of a detrunent to Champlin (Br. 14, 23)
are beside

the point.

We

would only

note

the testimony of Champlin's land

manager, Mr. Lagerstrom, who said as to Section 7 of the agreement, th11t in his
view, Champlin would have no objection if a landowner agreed to share the 2 1/2%
payment with someone else after receiving the money from Champlin.

(Lager-

strom deposition, pp. 55-56.)
D.

The Newton's deed to Bass was effective to assign a one-half share in

the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment:-Whether the 2 1/2% payment is "a property
interest in the oil and gas"-and Flying Diamond says it is not (Br. 31)--is not an
issue in this lawsuit.

The Newtons have admitted that they rntended the

cover the 2 1/2% payment.

(R. 426, Fdg. No. 6;

H. 270-272.)

deed to

The

1/2%

payment was the only interest the Newtons had 1n the railroad lands apHrt from
their ownership of the surface.

(Tr. 75-76.)

Mr. Collister testified that the 2

1/2% payment was a subject of the "royalty (of any type)" languflge m part I. ll of
the deed.

(Collister deposition, p. 48.)

This evidence is Hdm1ssible to 1dent1fy the

subject matter of paragraph l. B of the Newtons' deed.
§ 1040.

When

the

time came

I 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence

for Flying Diamo11d to HC'qu1re

stmre of the

R

payment, the same words "a royalty (of any type') from product1011 of

mi11erals"

were used in the Ranch Purchase Contract.
The payment
reference

in

is certainly a royalty of

the Newtons' deed to

11

so111e

ty1w, s1prH,

p.

9, and

the

"royalty (<lf Hny type') fro111 the p1·uduct1on of
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111

mernls"

is

adequate

to

<'unclusion of Law No.

describe the payment.

3 (R.

426)

that

the

Clearly, the district court's

Newtons'

deed accomplished

the

intended assignment is correct.
Flying Diamond argues (Br. 24, 26) that the assignment to Bass of a share in
the 2 1/2% payment must fail because the Newtons are no longer "entitled" to the
2 1/2% payment.

The evidence as to the meaning of the word "entitled", is

Collister's testimony that the word was used in paragraph I. B of the Newton's
deed

to

cover

recognize.

other

additional

(Supra, p. 7.)

mineral

rights

that

the

railroad

might

not

The part of the Newtons' deed quoted (Br. 26), rather

than being a recognition of the "severability problem", is a clear indication that
t11e Newtons and Bass believed that shares in the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment
were assignable and wished to make certain that future assignments would be
recognized.
Flying Diamond's argument based upon Restatement (Second) Of Contracts, S
320, presumes the ultimate issue in the lawsuit.

Since the Newtons' right to the 2

1/2% payment arose upon the execution of the Surface Owner's Agreement, there
wt1s nothing conditional t1bout that right which would preclude an assignment to
Hass.

II
FLYING DIAMOND IS ESTOPPED TO DENY
THAT IT HAS ONLY A ONE-FOURTH INTEREST
IN THE PROCEEDS OF THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT
The Newtons testified (Tr. 75) that the only mineral interest which they had
1n tile

railroad land when they contracted with Flying Diamond, was a one-half
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interest in the 2 1/2% payment.

(Tr. 64, 65, 80, 81.)

The te,,t1rno11y of Scot l

IJJl(J

Ralph Newton (Tr. 64) shows that Flying Diamond was told of the Newtons' deed
to Bass and agreed to a one-fourth share of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment.
This evidence is admissible to identify the subject matter of paragraph 6 (a) (2) of
the Ranch Purchase Contract.
been recorded.

(R. 293.)

17 Arn. Jur. 2d., Evidence S 1040.

The deed had

It is obvious that the language used in the Ranch

Purchase Contract to describe the interest Flying Diarnond was purchasing from
the Newtons is virtually identical to the language used in the Newtons' deed to
describe the share in the 2 1/2% payment assigned to Bass.

The deed to Bass

contains the following language:
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from production
of minerals that Grantor actually receives or is entitled to
receive until February 1, 2072, * * *
which is tracked in paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase Contract as follows:
One-half of the royalty (of any type) from the production of minerals that the Seller actually receives or is entitled to receive from the property so designated in attachment A-1 until January 1, 2073. * * *
No evidence was offered that Flying Diamond intended to acquire more than
a one-fourth share in the 2 1/2% payment.
37)

that

Finding of Fact No.

Fly111g !Jrnmond's argument (l:lrief, p.

9 is unsupported because

there 1s no extrinsic

evidence of Flying Diamond's subjective intent ignores the rule that sub;ective
intent is not relevant. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P. 2d 653 (Utah 1979).
The district court's Find111g of Fact is that (R. 526):
It was the intent of Newtons to trnnsfer to Fly9.
ing Diamond and the intent of Flying ll1arnond to acquire
one-fourtt1 of the 2 1/2% payment.
Clearly, the Finding of Ftlcl 1s supµorted by the ev1dt'11ee.
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Flying Diamond argues that paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the Ranch Purchase
Contract was mere surplusage at the time it was drafted and has no significance
in

this lawsuit.

The district court, however, was obligated, so far as possible, to

give effect to all of the language of the contract. 17 Am. Jur.

S 259.

2d, Contracts

Consistent with that obligation the district court's Conclusion of Law No. 7

states as follows (R. 426):
Flying Diamond is estopped to deny that it has
7.
only a one-fourth interest in the 2 1/2% payment.
This conclusion of law is based upon principles of equitable estoppel.

Those

considerations estop Flying Diamond from now asserting that it acquired the right
to all of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment. Dillon Inv. Co. v.
2d 493 (Kan.

1952).

Kiniken, 241 P.

The equitable considerations involved in this case are

reviewed in 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel And Waiver, S 13, where the following is
stated:
Strictly speaking, estoppel by deed does not ordinarily
apply to the grantee. A grantee who accepts a deed is,
however, es topped in certain respects. Estoppel of the grantee of a deed, viewed generally, is of the nature of equitable estoppel rather than technical estoppel by deed, since
the estoppel is not predicated primarily on the execution of
a formal written instrument which cannot be denied or rebutted, but rather on the inability of a person, in the eyes
of the law, to acquiesce in, and enjoy the benefits of, a
transaction, and at the same time reject the accompanying
burdens. A person cannot claim under an instrument without
confirming it. He must found his claim on the whole, and
c~nnot adopt that feature or operation which makes it in his
ftivor, and tit the same time repudiate or contradict another
which is counter or adverse to it. • • •
These equitable considerations, will not permit Flying Diamond to claim all
of the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment when the Ranch Purchase Contract, upon
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which Flying Diamond relies for its ti tie to the rnilroad lnnds, granted less thlin all
of the proceeds.

Russell v.

Texas Company, 238 F. 2d 636 (9th Cir.

1957), cert.

den. 354 U.S. 938.
In the Russell case, the Nor them Pacific Railroad Company had conveyed
certain lands to plaintiff Russell's grantor with a reservation of the minerals.
Russell claimed the minerals on the theory that, because of an Act of Congress,
the railroad lacked the power to reserve the minerals to itself when it conveyed
the land.

The Ninth Circuit disposed of Russell's claim in the following language

(238 F. 2d at 640):
Appellant in the case at bar would have us declare
void a mineral reservation which appears expressly in the
very deed through which he, himself, claims title. He asserts no independent source of title. On the contrary, he
insists that the express recitals in the deed to his predecessor in title (of which he had notice) were ineffective
irrespective of the intentions of the parties to the conveyance or the bargain into which they entered.
Even if we
were to resort to hypothesizing, it would, indeed, be difficult for us to imagine a more obvious case of estoppel.

•

•

•

•

•

The law is clear that where the grantee of surface
rights or his successors in interest seek to remove the cloud
of the grantor's mineral reservation, it must be established
that the grantee's rights to the interest reserved flow from
an independent source of title, See 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 38
(f), p. 218. Where, however, the surfoce owner claims title
to the mineral rights, which his grantor expressly reserved
to himself on the theory that his gr11ntor had no right to
make such a reservation, the owner of the surfHce 1s estopped from asserting thlit the mineral rights thereby passed to
him in the instrument of conveyance, :vlorse v. Smyth, D.C.
1918, 255 F. 981; Wier v. The Texas r:o., 5 Cir., 1950, 180
F. 2d 465. This doctrine has been enunciated 111 as many
ways as there are individual factual sit111it1ons to Justify its
application. Estoppel, in the nature of an equitable concept,
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ts designed to protect the reliances and expectations of
innocent persons from detrimental devastation by those who
by assent and recognition have induced those reliances and
expectations. Whenever the invocation of a rule results in
the dental of a remedy, caution implicitly governs discretion.
Caution must give way to reasoned judgment, however,
where, as in the case at bar, the facts so overwhelmingly
justify the application of the doctrine.
To disregard its
applicability in this case would be to invite a miscarriage of
Justice.
Flying Diamond would avoid an estoppel by the assertion that the grant under
the Ranch Purchase Contract was a quitclaim of any royalty from the railroad
lands.

(R. 37 .) This assertion ignores the provision at the beginning of paragraph

6 of the contract that "the seller [Newton) will execute a Warranty Deed for the"
interest granted in subparagraph 6 (a) (2).
More importantly, this case does not involve the technical concept of
estoppel by deed involved in Flying Diamond's citation, 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel
And Waiver,

§

9. (Br. 37.)

Estoppel by deed is concerned with the denial of

solemn assertions in a deed. The estoppel involved in this case is of the nature of
equitable estoppel and ts concerned with the effort of Flying Diamond to enjoy a
be11ef1t of the Ranch Purchase Contract-ownership of the railroad lands-and
avoid the burden of the contract-only a one-fourth rnterest in the proceeds of
production from those lands. Of course, Flying Diamond may deny that any estate
or interest passed to 1t by the Ranch Purchase Contract but such a denial would
leave Flying Diamond with no interest in the railroad lands or in the 2 1/2%
p11yment.
As to Flying Dtllmond's claim of an estoppel by deed (Br. 34), the rule is that
one who claims an estoppel must have been misled by the deed.
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28 Am. Jur. 2d.,

Estoppel And Waiver, S 10.

There is no evidence of innocent reliance and

expectations on Flying Diamond's part.
As to the "practical construction" of the Surface Owner's Agreement (Br. 2427) all of the parties viewed the proceeds of the 2 1/2% payment as assignable, as
evidenced by paragraph I. B of the Newtons' deed and paragraph 6 (a) (2) of the
Ranch Purchase Contract.

There was no construct10n to the contrary until Flying

Diamond refused to distribute the proceeds.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIHCLOUGH

Claron C. Spencer

Keith W. Meade
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